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I.  BUDGET I lEADING:  APPROPRIATIONS: 
lll-1508  EUR 267 million (LA) 
2.  TITLE:  Proposal for a 
Council Regulation amending Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 on the common organisation of  the market 
in bananas. 
3.  LEGAL BASIS: Article 37 of  the Treaty 
4.  AIMS: 
To amend the system of  banana imports. 
5.  FINANCIAL IMPL!CA  TIONS  PERIOD OF  CURRENT  FOLLOWING 
12MONTHS  FINANCIAL  FINANCIAL 
YEAR [2000]  YEAR [2001] 
( EUR million)  ( EUR million)  (EUR million) 
5.0  EXPENDITURE  77  3 I •  76 
.  CHARGED TO THE EC BUDGET 
(I'I!FI 1~\P~'INTERVENTION) 
.  ~~~TI'l~IAL AIITU,-~I~rl'llil!t 
.  QTIILU~ 
5.1  REVENUE  30  15  30 
.  OWN RESOURCES OF THE EC 
(LEVIES/CUSTOMS DUTIES) 
.  NATIONAL 
2002  2003  2004  2005 
5.0.1  ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE  76  76  77  77 
5.1.1  ESTIMATED REVENUE  30  30  30  30 
5.2  METHOD OF CALCULATION: 
See annex. 
6.0  CAN THE PROJECT BE FINANCED FROM APPROPRIATIONS ENTERED IN 
THE RELEVANT CHAPTER OF THE CURRENT BUDGET?  ~/NO 
h. I  CAN TI IE  PROJECT BE FINANCED BY TRANSFER BETWEI<N CHAPTERS 
01' TilE CURRENT BUDGET!  ~/NO 
h.2  WILL A SUPPLEMENTARY IIUIJUET BE NECESSARY!  YES /1>10 
6.3  WILL FUTURE BUDGET APPROPRIATIONS BE NECESSARY!  YES /1>10 
OBSERV  AT!ONS: 
The calculations assume that the transitional system is applied. A fignre cannot be put at this stage on the 
impact of  a "tariff only" system. 
It should also be noted that the figure of  EUR 77 million could be reached even under the current system if  the 
ACP countries increase their production and reach the duty-free export quota currently available to them. 
•  The figure for 2000 is based on the grant of  an adva~ce equal to  70%~ of  the new estimated compensatory 
aid in respect of  the quantities marketed in 2000. 
Should ·the aid be set at 70% of  the estimated aid before reform, the additional amount of  expenditure 
estimated for 2000 would be carried over entirely to the 2001  budget year; total additional expenditure 
would then amount to EUR 107 million. 
1 Bananas 
Calculation of the proposal's financial implications 
Calculation data 
1 The  Union's  supply  balance  in 
bananas 










b Bound quota (A)  2 200 000 
c Autonomous quota (B)  353 000 
volume  2 553 000 
availat:He 
average  2 420 000 
volume 
used 
balance  133 000 
unused 
d Traditional ACP bananas (C)  850 000 
Additional total available 
2 Utilisation of available quantities 
A Total quantity added 
B Increase in supply 
C Inverse elasticity of demand 
D Resulting reduction in price 
e Average cif prices recorded 
f Unit reduction in price 
g New price 
h Additional  reduction  by  virtue  of  increased 
competition 
i Additional unit reduction in price 
j Total unit reduction 
k Total fall in price 
3 Total extra expenditure 
4 Revenue from customs duties 
a Duties from quotas A and B 
b Estimated duties from quota C 
5 Total additional duties 
2 
volume  660 000 
used 
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Following·  a ruling adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organisation 
in  1997,  on  20  July  1998  the  Council  adopted  Regulation  (EC)  No  1637/98  amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 on the common organisation of the market in bananas, in order 
to bring those elements of the import regime found to be incompatible with WTO rules into 
line with our WTO obligations whilst also respecting the Community's other objectives. 
The  modified regime entered into force  on  1 January 1999.  The WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body subsequently found that the revised regime was not fully compatible with WTO rules. 
The  United States  imposed retaliatory  measures  in  the  form  of prohibitive  tariffs  on  EC 
products to a value of USD 191,4 million. 
Following the latest WTO ruling, the Commission has had extensive contacts with interested 
parties  with  a  view  to  putting  forward  a  proposal  which  would  be  generally  accepted as 
resolving this dispute. 
An  interim report on  these contacts was  given to the Council on 26 May 1999, which  also 
described in a very exhaustive form all the options that are theoretically available to deal with 
the  situation.  Since  then,  further  contacts  have  been  held  with  complainants  and  other 
governments  concerned,  and  also  with  many  of the  operators  in  the  banana  trade.  The 
Commission reported to the Council on  these contacts on  13  September 1999. The Council 
requested the Commission to present a proposal. 
Such a proposal should meet the Community's obligations under the WTO as well as its key 
concerns regarding Community and ACP banana producers and the need to respect the strict 
limitations on the Community budget. 
From these contacts it has emerged that in general Latin American banana-exporting countries 
prefer a tariff quota system.  Most of the  trade operators also favour this  approach.  Other 
interested parties insist on a flat tariff approach, possibly after a transitional period in which a 
TRQ  would  apply.  Among  the  ACP  countries,  the  majority  believe  that  their  social  and 
economic interests would best be served by the maintenance of the TRQ system, but some can 
accept the concept of a transitional regime towards a flat  tariff. However, the contacts have 
also made apparent that there is wide divergence in the positions of different interested parties 
as regards the distribution of licences. 
The Commission believes that the most stable system is that based on a flat tariff. It is also the 
system most immune from WTO challenges and therefore it offers the most predictable and 
stable environment for both producers and operators. 
The Commission also recognises the  widespread  preference for a TRQ system.  But it has 
concluded that  acceptance  of such  a  system,  if it  can  be  achieved,  can  only  be  so  on  a 
transitional  basis,  leading to a flat  tariff system.  It is  clear that a transitional TRQ system 
would  ease  the  adjustment  to  a  flat  tariff  system,  and  would  facilitate  the  necessary 
adaptations in  the ACP banana-supplying countries and in  the banana producing regions of 
the Community. 
For these  reasons  the  Commission  has  concluded that  a two-stage ·process  is  a preferred 
option. 
2 Outline of  the proposal 
In  light  of the  above,  a  proposal  for  the  modification  of the  ex1stmg  import  regime  for 
bananas is attached, based on a flat tariff after a transitional period during which a tariff quota 
system would apply, with preferential tariff access for ACP countries. The level of the flat 
tariff  will  need  to  be  negotiated  under  Article  XXVIII  GATT.  A  mandate  for  such 
negotiations is therefore part of  the proposal of  the Commission. A flat tariff system should be 
introduced by 1 January 2005. 
The proposed transitional system envisages three  tariff rate  quotas.  The first  is  a quota of 
2.2 million tonnes at a rate ofEUR 75/tonne, which is bound in our WTO Tariff Schedule. To 
this quantity of  2.2 million t,  a second quantity of 353 000 t at the same tariff level would be 
added. 
A third tariff quota of [850]  000 would also be opened.  This quota would be open to  both 
ACP and MFN bananas but, for ACP access, a preference of EUR 275/t would be accorded 
for ACP bananas (implying that the tariff on ACP bananas would be zero as long as the tariff 
within the quota did not exceed EUR 275/t). The proposed system for the third quota would 
resolve both the level of the tariff and the distribution of licences to  operators as  it would 
produce automatically a balance between the number of licences requested and the available 
quantities.  This  quota  would  be  characterised  by a  bidding  procedure  through  which  an 
abatement with respect to the out-of-quota bound tariff rate would be determined. The lowest 
level of bidding at which the  quota can be  filled  would be applied to  all  operators for the 
quantities for which they have put forward a bid (striking price system). 
Quota allocation 
As regards the management of  the first two tariff quotas, it is to be expected that, because of 
the relatively low level of the in-quota tariff (EUR 75/t), licences for more quantities will be 
requested than can be allocated within the quota.  For this reason, a system of rationing of 
licences would be necessary. In legal terms this is  a question of detailed rules to apply the 
tariff quota and as such would be dealt with in the Commission's implementing regulation. It 
is, however, of  considerable importance for the acceptability of  the system. 
The methods of distributing licences giving access to tariff quotas which are most frequently 
cited in discussions within the WTO are traditional/newcomer based on a historical reference, 
first-come/first-served, simultaneous examination, and auctioning. 
Auctioning  is  used  by some  WTO  Members  and it  is  an  economically rational  means of 
licence  distribution.  It is,  however,  controversial  because  it  is  argued  that  the  licence  fee 
constitutes  an additional tariff which infringes the tariff binding (in this  instance EUR 75 
within the first tariff quota, at which level excess demand for licences is to be expected). 
Distribution of licences through simultaneous  examination of licence requests  is  a widely 
used system, but in the case of this attractive tariff quota it can be expected that there would 
be  heavy  over-subscription and  subsequently  large  reduction  coefficients.  In  view  of the 
specific characteristics of  the banana trade the introduction of such a system might not ensure 
the ending of  the dispute. 
A  means  of limiting  potential  requests  for  licences  and  reducing  the  size  of reduction 
coefficients is to  require that the bananas must be physically present in a Community port 
before  the  import  licence  can  be  requested.  As  this  system  would  inevitably  lead  to  a 
3 competition among operators to  fulfil  the criteria, the system is sometimes referred to as  a 
"ship race" or  "pure" first-come, first-served.  Although this system might be acceptable to 
the United States, it is opposed by several of  the banana-supplying countries. 
The practical application of such a system could, however, present a number of  technical and 
administrative difficulties, both to  the Commission and national administrations, which need 
to be addressed in depth. 
Finally, there is the traditional/newcomer system. This is the system all the interested parties 
would  prefer  us  to  employ.  It requires,  however,  an  uncontested  reference  period  and 
definition of"  operator". 
The  latest  WTO  panel  condenrned  the  existing  regime,  which  was  based  on  the  period 
1994-96  and  imports  by real  importers,  because of the  drag-on  effect  from  the  previous 
regime. 
In theory, such drag-on effect could be avoided by making reference to  a period before the 
entry into force of  the banana regime. However, that period was affected by national policies 
and is too distant from the reality of  the present market. A distribution system based solely on 
a pre-1993 reference period would pose problems of compatibility with EC and international 
law. 
It follows that a historical system could be adopted only if a mutually satisfactory solution is 
reached,  respecting  EC  and  international  legal  obligations.  The  Commission  will  pursue 
contacts  with  interested  parties  to  see  whether  it  is  possible  to  achieve  such  a mutually 
satisfactory solution. 
In light of the above, the preferred option for licence distribution is  a historical system, but 
only if agreement of all parties on a mechanism compatible with EC law can be found. Since 
such  an  agreement  appears  unlikely  at  this  stage  the  alternative  solution  would  be  an 
appropriate  form  of a  first-come,  first-served  system  provided  that  the  administrative 
problems can be overcome in such a way that  the  scheme is  both physically practical and 
demonstrably non-discriminatory. 
As regards tariff quota allocation between prinCipal suppliers, the WTO panel concluded that, 
as  there is no representative reference period, it can only be maintained if agreement can be 
found  with  all principal  suppliers.  At  present no  such  agreement exists  and the  allocation 
should therefore end. As, however, two of  the principal supplying countries claim the right to 
have  a  distribution  based  on  the  framework  agreement,  the  proposal  leaves  open  the 
possibility of  distribution should the main suppliers all agree to it. 
The discussions of the Commission with interested parties will continue during the period in 
which the Council and the Pprliament are examining the proposal. By the time the Council is 
ready to  take  a decision,  that  is  to  say by  the  time  Parliament  expresses  its  opinion,  the 
Commission will make a report on the outcome of the discussions with the interested parties 
on the TRQ system. If then no  feasible administrative system which will resolve the dispute 
has been found,  the Commission will not be able to  maintain its proposal for a transitional 
regime. In such a situation the Council should adopt the attached negotiating instructions to 
mandate the Commission to  initiate GATT Article XXVIII negotiations immediately with a 
view to replacing the current regime with a flat tariff.  · 
4 Implications for negotiation of  the successor to the current Lome Convention 
The  proposed  changes  to  the  banana  import  regime  outlined  here,  indicating  a  firm 
commitment to a tariff-only regime  after a. transitional period during  which  a TRQ system 
would be in force,  have implications for the current negotiations on the successor agreement 
to the present Lome Convention, which expires on 29 February 2000. 
The results to date of these negotiations, as far as trade is concerned, indicate a consensus on 
the need to proceed to new, WTO-compatible arrangements after an  appropriate preparatory 
period  (e.g.  five  or  ten  years)  during  which  the  existing  Lome  preferences  would  be 
maintained. Continuation of these preferences would require a new waiver covering the whole 
of the envisaged preparatory period. 
As  the  proposed alternative to  the banana regime would only need  a general  provision for 
preferences to be granted under the successor agreement, for which an Article I waiver will be 
sought at an  appropriate time, it does not require the renewal of the Banana Protocol, which 
has been made virtually inoperable by successive WTO decisions. The Council, on a proposal 
from the Commission, will need to examine what conclusions it should draw for this in terms 
of the balance of advantages to be granted in the course of the  present negotiations. In  the 
light of the Council decision  on  the present proposals it may also need to examine what, if 
any,  further measures  may  be  appropriate,  in  particular for  the  most  vulnerable  countries, 
most heavily dependent upon bananas. 
Implications for the Structural Funds 
As stated above, one of the objects of the transitional regime is to enable Community banana-
producing regions to make appropriate adjustments to a freer market. Appropriate use of the 
resources allocated to Member States from the Structural Funds, within  the existing overall 
objectives of the Community Structural Funds, could have  an  important role to  play in  this 
process. 
As should be clear from this memorandum and from  the Communications to  the Council of 
26 May and  13  September 1999, finding the  means whereby the Community can amend its 
regime  to  respect  all  its  international  obligations  as  well  as  its  responsibilities  to  its  own 
producers  represents a considerable challenge. The  Commission is  nonetheless determined, 
with the cooperation of the Council, to achieve this result. 
5 Proposal for a 
COUNCIL  ·REGULATION 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 on the common organisation 
of  the market in bananas 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community,  and  m  particular 
Article 3  7 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission
1
, 
Having regard to the opinion of  the European Parliament
2
, 
Having regard to the opinion of  the Economic and Social Committee
3
, 










There have been numerous close contacts with supplier countries and other interested 
parties to settle the disputes arising from the import regime established by Regulation 
(EEC) No 404/93, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1637/98, and to take account of 
the conclusions of  the special group set up under the dispute settlement system of  the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
Analysis of  all the options presented by the Commission suggests that establishment in 
the medium term of  an import system founded on the application of a customs duty at 
an  appropriate  rate  and  application  of  a  preferential  tariff  to  imports  from 
ACP countries provides the best guarantees, firstly of achieving the objectives of the 
common organisation of the market as regards Community production and consumer 
demand, secondly of complying with the rules on international trade, and thirdly of 
preventing further disputes. 
However, such a system must be introduced upon completion of  negotiations with the 
Community's  partners  in  accordance  with  WTO  procedures,  in  particular 
Article XXVIII of  the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
Until the entry into  force  of that regime, the Community should be  supplied under 
several tariff quotas open to  imports from  all  origins and managed in  line with the 
recommendations  made  by  the  dispute  settlement  body.  The  first  tariff quota  of 
OJC ... , ...... ,p  .. 
OJC ... , ...... ,p  .. 
OJC ... , ...... ,p  .. 
OJC ... , ...... ,p  .. 
6 2 200 000  tonnes  at  a  rate  of EUR 75  should  be  bound  in  the  WTO.  A  second, 
additional tariff quota of 353 000 tonnes should be opened to cater for the increase in 
consumption resulting from enlargement of the Community in  1995, with  the  same 
rate  applying. To ensure satisfactory supply to the Community, a third, autonomous 
tariff quota of [850 000) tonnes should be opened, also for all origins. Under this latter 
tariff quota, the common customs tariff rate should be reduced in accordance with the 
most appropriate method, and the preferential tariff granted to the ACP countries must 
be applied. 
(5)  In  view  of the  contractual obligations  towards  the  ACP countries  and the  need to 
guarantee them proper conditions of competition, application to  imports of bananas 
originating in those countries of a tariff preference of EUR 275 per tonne would allow 
the  trade  flows  in  question  to  be  maintained.  This  will  entail  in  particular  the. 
application to such imports of zero duty under .the first two tariff quotas, and a cut of 
EUR 275 in the duty to  be paid under the third tariff quota after application  of the 
aforementioned reduction. 
(6)  The Commission should be authorised to  open  negotiations  with  supplier countries 
having  a  substantial  interest in  supplying  the  Community  market  to endeavour to 
achieve a negotiated allocation of the first two tariff quotas. The Commission should 
also be granted authority to lay down  rules for the management of the tariff quotas 
established by this Regulation. 
(7)  Provision  should be  made  for  the  additional  tariff quota  of 353 000  tonnes  to  be 
modified to take account of any increased Community demand found when a supply 
balance is drawn up. Provision should also be made for suitable specific action to be 
taken  in  response  to  exceptional  circumstances  liable  to  affect  supply  of  the 
Community market. 
(8)  Accordingly, amendments should be made to Title IV of Regulation (EEC) No 404/93, 
HAS ADOPTED TillS REGULATION: 
Article I 
Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 is hereby amended as follows: 
1)  Articles 16 to 20 of Title IV are replaced by the following: 
"Article 16 
1.  Articles 16 to 20 of this Title shall apply to imports of fresh products falling 
within  CN code ex 0803 00 19  up  to the entry into force  of the  rate  of the 
common  customs  tariff  for  those  products,  no  later  than  1 January  2006, 
established under the procedure provided for in Article XXVIII of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
2.  Until the entry into force of the rate referred to in  paragraph 1,  imports of the 
fresh products referred to in paragraph 1 shall be under the tariff quotas opened 
by Article 18. 
7 Article 17 
To the extent necessary, importation of bananas into the Community shall be subject 
to submission of an  import licence, to be issued by Member States to any interested 
parties  irrespective of their place .of establishment in  the  Community and without 
prejudice to specific provisions adopted for the application of Articles I8 and I9. 
Such  import  licences  shall  be  valid  throughout  the  Community.  Except  where 
derogations are  adopted under the procedure laid down  in  Article  27,  the issue of 
licences shall be subject to lodging of a security against a commitment to import on 
the  terms  of this  Regulation  during the  period of the  licence's validity. Except in 
cases of  force majeure the security shall be wholly or partly forfeit if the operation is 
not or is only partly carried out within the time allowed. 
Article 18 
I.  Each year from I January the following tariff quotas shall be opened: 
a)  a tariff quota of 2 200 000 tonnes net weight, called "quota A"; 
b)  an additional tariff quota of 353 000 tonnes net weight, called "quota B"; 
c)  an  autonomous  tariff  quota  of  850 000  tonnes  net  weight,  called 
"quota C". 
These tariff quotas shall be open for imports of products originating in all third 
countries. 
The  Commission  may,  on  the  basis  of  an  agreement  with  World  Trade 
Organisation  contracting parties  with  a  substantial  interest  in  the  supply  of 
bananas, allocate tariff quotas "A" and "B" among supplier countries. 
2.  Imports under tariff quotas  "A"  and  "B"  shall  be  subject to customs duty of 
EUR 75 per tonne. 
3.  By derogation from Article 15, imports under tariff quota "C"  shall be  subj~ct 
to the duty referred to in that Article less a reduction which may be determined 
by tender. 
4.  A tariff preference of EUR 275  per tonne shall apply to  imports originating in 
ACP countries both under and outside the tariff quotas. 
5.  The duty rates set in this Article shall be converted into national currency at the 
rates applicable for the products in  question for the  purposes of the  common 
customs tariff. 
6.  The additional tariff quota provided for in paragraph  l(b) may be increased if 
demand  in  the  Community  increases  as  indicated  by  a  balance  sheet  of 
production, consumption, imports and exports. 
The  balance  sheet  shall  be  adopted and  the  tariff quota  increased under the 
procedure set out in Article 27. 
8 7.  Where  supply  of  the  Community  market  is  subject  to  exceptional 
circumstances affecting production or importation, the Commission shall adopt 
the specific measures necessary under the procedure set out in Article 27. 
In such cases the additional tariff quota "B" may be adjusted on the basis of  the 
balance sheet referred to  in paragraph 6.  The specific measures may derogate 
from  the  rules  adopted  under  Article  19(1).  They  must  not  discriminate 
between third countries. 
8.  Bananas  re-exported  from  the  Community shall  not  be  counted  against  the 
corresponding tariff quotas. 
Article 19 
1.  The  tariff quotas may be  managed in  accordance with the  method based on 
taking  account  of traditional  trade  flows  ("traditionals/newcomers")  and/or 
other methods. 
2.  The method adopted shall take account as  appropriate of the need to maintain 
the equilibrium of supply to the Community market. 
Article 20 
The Commission shall adopt provisions to implement this Title under the procedure 
set out in Article 27. Their scope shall include: 
a)  rules on the management of  the tariff quotas referred to in Article 18; 
b)  where required, guarantee of  the nature and origin of  the products; 
c)  measures needed to ensure respect for obligations stemming from agreements 
concluded by the Community under Article 300 of  the Treaty. 
2)  The seventh indent of  Article 29 is replaced by the following: 
"- quantities of Community and ACP bananas and bananas from  third countries 
other than ACP countries marketed in their territory". 
3)  Article 32 is deleted. 
4)  The Annex is deleted. 
Article 2 
This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following its publication in the Official 
Journal of  the European Communities. 
It shall apply from 1 April2000. 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in air Member States. 
9 Done at Brussels, 
For the Council 
The President 
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